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An Eye For a Wetland? Exploring Retribution 
As a Theory of Environmental Sentencing 
Paul A. Gillan Jr. 
Of late, the great hue and cry among legislators and 
politicians is for greater penalties to be imposed upon 
environmental criminals. Criminal penalties for acts 
such as polluting the waters of the United States have 
existed for well over one hundred years,l yet it is only 
the last decade that has seen significant development in 
the enforcement of environmental statutes through 
criminal penalties. Indeed, the case considered to be the 
first "environmental crime" case, United States v. 
Frezzo Brothers,2 was decided only fifteen years ago. 3 
Relative to other crimes, environmental crimes are 
comparatively young. 
Despite its youth, the area of environmental crimes 
has developed into an established part of the criminal 
justice system. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual, for example, devotes an entire section to the 
sentencing of environmental crimes.4 Currently, the 
environmental section covers only the sentencing of 
individual crimes. The Sentencing Commission's first 
attempt at developing a parallel section for corporate 
offenders met with such opposition that the proposed 
section was immediately withdrawn.5 
Incidents such as the failure of the corporate guide-
lines proposal illustrate the heightened tension associ-
ated with the sentencing of environmental crimes. The 
public demands that environmental criminals be pun-
ished with a heavy hand.6 Conversely, businesses 
complain of intrusion into day-to-day management, the 
hindrance of compliance, and the increasing willingness 
of courts to pierce the corporate veil, exposing directors 
and officers to personal liability. 
The debate over the harshness of environmental 
criminal penalties centers around the deterrence factor 
of criminal sanctions. In fact, deterrence has been cited 
almost exclusively as the dominant theory behind envi-
ronmental sentencing.7 Other theories of sentencing 
such as rehabilitation, isolation, and retribution have 
not been addressed. 
The purpose of this article is to explore retribution 
as a viable theory in the sentencing of environmental 
crimes. Part I provides a brief overview of current 
methods of imposing environmental sanctions. Part II 
discusses deterrence as the main theory behind environ-
mental sentencing and explains why the exclusive use of 
deterrence leaves theoretical gaps in sentence justifica-
tion. Part III explores retribution as a theory of 
sentencing, and Part IV briefly discusses one possible 
counter-argument to the theory in section three. The 
article concludes by recognizing a societal obligation to 
explore retribution as a justification for environmental 
sentencing. 
I. Current Environmental Sentencing Procedures: 
The Statutes and the Guidelines 
Most of the major environmental statutes8 have 
provisions for the imposition of criminal sanctions.9 
The complexity of the criminal violation section varies 
from statute to statute. The content of each section 
correlates both with the nature of the statute (advisory 
v. regulatory), and with the nature of the substance or 
acts governed. 
On the least complex end of the continuum is the 
Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) provision. The 
statute simply provides that anyone who "knowingly or 
willfully" violates the provisions of TSCA shall be 
subject to a fine of up to $25,000 for each day of 
violation and imprisonment of not more than one year. 10 
On a more complex level is the Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). The FIFRA 
provisions describe various levels offines depending on 
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the person or business that is regulated. Producers)) 
who violate FIFRA face fines of up to $50,000 and one 
year in prison.)2 Commercial applicators)3 may be 
assessed up to $25,000 in criminal fines and one year in 
prison. )4 Private applicators)5 are least threatened, with 
potential penalties ranging from fines of $1,000 to up 
to thirty days in prison. )6 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) is an example of the 
most comprehensive and complex environmental crim-
inal penalty statutes. Criminal activity under the CW A 
is divided into three groups: negligent violations, 
knowing violations, and knowing endangerment. 
For negligent violations, a first-time offender faces 
a maximum penalty of fines ranging from $2,500 to 
$25,000 for each day ofthe offense or imprisonment for 
up to one year. )7 For a subsequent conviction under this 
section, an individual faces a fine of up to $50,000 or 
imprisonment for up to two years.)8 
For knowing violations, the amount of the penalty 
is substantially higher. First-time offenders may be 
assessed fines ranging from $5,000 to $50,000 per day 
of violation and up to three years in prison.)9 Repeat 
offenders risk fines of up to $100,000 and six years in 
prison.20 
Knowing endangerment involves, through a viola-
tion of the regulatory provisions of the CW A, placing 
another individual "in imminent danger of death or 
serious bodily injury."2) A person convicted under this 
section may be fined up to $250,000 and faces impris-
onment for as long as fifteen years. A business convict-
ed under this section may be fined up to $1,000,000. 
For repeat offenders, the penalties are doubled both as 
to fines and as to jail time.22 
Like the CW A, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA) has a knowing endangerment 
provision. Both statutes provide limitations as to what 
is considered "knowing," and detail the affirmative 
defense that the endangerment was a "reasonably fore-
seeable hazard[] of an occupation, a business, or a 
profession; or medical treatment or medical or scientific 
experimentati on. "23 
All of the statutes mentioned above are federal 
statutes. Accordingly, violations are prosecuted in 
federal courts, and are subject to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines. 
The Guidelines were created to ensure honesty, 
uniformity, and proportionality in sentencing24 and op-
erate on a numerically-oriented basis. Offenses are 
-- ---- -------'---' 
assigned a certain number, the "base level offense" 
value, which undergoes a series of calculations to arrive 
at a final number. That number is then plugged into a 
chart to determine the possible sentence range. The 
higher the number, the greater the minimum and max-
imum allowable sentence. 
The sentencing procedure is best illustrated by 
example. Assume a manufacturer is convicted under 
RCRA25 of one count of habitually dumping a mercuric 
compound wash on his own property. The manufactur-
er accomplished this "disposal" by ordering his night 
maintenance employee to carry the compound out in a 
bucket and spread it around in some tall grass near a 
fence. This process continued for about eleven or 
twelve years. 
The RCRA violation would be sentenced under 
section 2Q 1.2 of the Guidelines, which applies to 
mishandling of hazardous substances. Section 2Q 1. 2 
includes "specific offense characteristics," and under 
section 2Q1.2(b)(I)(A), the court may increase the 
sentencing level number "[i]fthe offense resulted in an 
ongoing, continuous, or repetitive discharge, release or 
emission. "26 
The court would then consider any "adjustments" 
under chapter three of the Guidelines. Section 3B 1.1 (c) 
provides for an increase in the sentencing level number 
ifthe defendant was an "organizer, leader, manager, or 
supervisor" in the criminal activity. Here, because the 
defendant exercised "decision-making authority," the 
offense level would be increased by twO.27 
Finally, because the defendant had been dumping 
the hazardous substance for a considerable length of 
time, the court may consider making a "guided depar-
ture" of up to two additionallevels. 28 Factors that may 
influence the court to make a guided departure include 
the harm resulting from the activity, the quantity and 
nature of the substance involved, the duration of the 
offense, and the risk associated with the violation. 
The final number is plugged into a chart to deter-
mine the sentencing range. In the hypothetical posed; 
even if the defendant fell into the lowest category, that 
is, the category with the least amount of past criminal 
conduct, the court would be obligated to impose a jail 
term of between twenty-seven and thirty months in 
length.29 Although the judge mayor may not impose 
criminal fines, the imposition of the jail term is manda-
tory. 
Two decades ago such a stiff sentence would have 
been unheard of Yet as the importance of preventing 
environmental violations continues to increase, both the 
sentences imposed and the potential sentences continue 
to increase as well. As section two more thoroughly 
illustrates, this step in the evolution of the environmen-
tal sentence has been attributed largely to the deterrent 
effect of increased penalties. 
II. Deterrence and the Need to Sentence Environ-
mental Criminals 
The premise that one convicted of a crime should be 
"punished" is often taken for granted. The thought of 
finding guilt is so closely associated with the imposition 
of sanctions that we scarcely 
consider the underlying rationale. 
on the principle that "he who sees [the first man] 
punished" will be deterred from committing a crime for 
fear of meeting the same fate. 33 The thrust behind both 
subsets is that a wrong once "done" cannot be "un-
done"; under a deterrent theory of sentencing, the 
principle to which we should most aspire is the preven-
tion of future like crimes. 
The newest theory of sentencing, rehabilitation, 
arose in the early twentieth century. Under this doc-
trine, the purpose of punishment is primarily to reform 
the criminal, or to "do something to, for or with the 
defendant so that when the person's sentence is com-
pleted ... the defendant ... will thereafter obey, not 
disobey, thelaw."34 The goal of 
rehabilitation is, arguably, pre-
Why do we punish? The ques-
tion often goes unconsidered. 
Centuries of ·thought and 
several gifted thinkers have pro-
vided four answers. Generally, 
the four objectives of criminal 
penalties are 1) deterrence, pre-
venting both the sentenced indi-
vidual and other individuals with 
the same propensities from com-
· .. as tile importance of 
preventing environmental 
venting recurrence ofthe crime. 
The distinction, however, is that 
rehabilitation focuses on the in-
dividual and not merely the violations continues to 
increase, botll tile sentenc-
es imposed and the poten-
tial sentences continue to 
cnme. 
Unlike a sentence based 
on rehabilitation, a sentence 
based on pure deterrence is im-
posed so that the specific crime increase as well 
mitting a crime; 2) isolation, 
separating the individual from 
society either to protect society 
or to force the defendant into reflective meditation; 3) 
rehabilitation, an institutional counteracting of the so-
cial or psychological forces that caused the original 
crime; and 4) retribution, pure punishment, an "eye for 
an eye."30 
Over time, emphasis has shifted among these four 
theories in accordance with contemporary social thought. 
The earliest theory of sentencing was probably retribu-
tion. 31 Later thought, led principally by Plato, put off the 
"unreasonable fury" inherent in retributive action and 
opted for the more rational justification of deterrence. 
"[H]e who desires to inflict rational punishment ... is 
desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees 
him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong 
again."32 
This statement illustrates the two main subsets of 
deterrent theory: specific deterrence and general deter-
rence. Specific deterrence embodies the idea that "the 
man who is punished" will not repeat his crime for fear 
of being punished again. General deterrence operates 
committed not recur, either by 
the sentenced defendant or by 
those who observe the execu-
tion of his punishment.35 The 
sentencing judge chooses a punishment with the goal of 
preventing recurrence of the crime. The rehabilitative 
sentence focuses specifically on the defendant, and asks 
by what means the forces which caused this particular 
defendant to commit a crime can be met and eradicated. 
The chief means of implementing this philosophy of 
rehabilitation was the "indeterminate sentence." A 
defendant convicted of a serious crime could face 
anywhere from one year to life in a correctional facility. 
Once committed, the prisoner works his way toward 
release by earning credits for good behavior. 36 Bad 
behavior earns demerits. 37 Upon the accumulation ofa 
certain number of credits, the prisoner is considered 
"rehabilitated" and released; the key to the prison door, 
so to speak, is left in the prisoner's hands. Indeterminate 
sentencing schemes, however, and rehabilitation with 
them, fell into judicial disfavor. 38 Since the decline of 
rehabilitation as a primary goal, deterrence has once 
again assumed a position at the forefront of criminal 
sentencing theory. 
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With respect to white-collar crimes, deterrence has 
found particular favor among sentencing theorists. 
Although the trend appears to be changing,39 white-
collar criminals have traditionally received light sen-
tences.4O So great was the historical pattern of leniency 
that a white-collar defendant in 1975 challenged his 
twenty-five year prison sentence on the basis of cruel 
and unusual punishment. 41 There, the judge observed 
that: 
[a] minority of the prison population are rightfully 
locked up because they are too dangerous to release.42 
Ifwe are to justify imprisonment for the rest, it must be 
on the grounds of punishment or deterrence. And ifthis 
is our premise, the white collar criminal must come to 
expect equal or greater treatment than the common, 
non-violent thief43 
In sentencing the white-collar criminal, the judge found 
a firm footing in the theory of deterrence. 
The court underscored this theory when it stated, "I 
doubt that deterrence will be very effective until the 
'executive' becomes convinced that ifhe embarks on a 
criminal adventure, he will be severely - though propor-
tionately - punished. Certainty is the key."44 The court 
upheld the twenty-five year prison term, indicating its 
desire to provide some "certainty" to the arena of 
white-collar sentencing.45 
With respect to sentencing of environmental crimes, 
deterrence has been the dominant underlying theory by 
far. Those involved in the investigation and subsequent 
prosecution of environmental crimes note the peculiar 
stigma attached to a criminal charge.46 The deterrent 
effect of criminal prosecution is evidenced by such 
statements as "I would starve before I would do it 
again."47 
Deterrence as a theory of sentencing is emphasized 
not only by those who are prosecuted under environ-
mental laws, but also by those who prosecute.48 Aca-
demics as well have centered their attention on the 
deterrent effect of environmental prosecutions.49 Al-
though acknowledging the existence of other sentenc-
ing theories, "the greatest emphasis in the environmen-
tal realm is placed on the deterrence effect a j ail sentence 
has upon future potential violators."5o 
Unfortunately, failure to acknowledge the retribu-
tive aspect of environmental prosecution results in a 
kind of schizophrenia. On one hand, the government is 
charging, prosecuting, and jailing environmental crim-
inals in the same way that it is prosecuting and jailing 
murderers, thieves, and rapists. At the same time, there 
is no concomitant acknowledgment that the act com-
mitted is truly a "crime" that would invoke the princi-
ples of retribution. In other words, if deterrence is the 
only theory upon which environmental sentencing is 
based, the seriousness of environmental crime is re-
duced from the level of a "crime" to what may more 
aptly be termed a violation. 
ill. Retribution 
Of the four theories of criminal sentencing, only 
retribution operates retroactively. Each of the others 
operates proactively, in that the effect is felt or aimed to 
be felt either at the moment of sentencing or at some 
point thereafter. 
Deterrence, for example, has as its specifically 
stated purpose the prevention of (1) recidivism on the 
part of the criminal (specific deterrence) and (2) the 
commission of like offenses by other criminals in the 
future. Rehabilitation, though theoretically and practi-
cally distinguishable from pure deterrence, nonetheless 
works towards the prevention of recidivism by remov-
ing the sociological and psychological influences that 
drove the individual's initial acts. Isolation protects 
society by incarcerating the criminal, thereby removing, 
at least for a period oftime, the possibility that the same 
criminal will commit further crimes. 
None of these theories addresses the criminal act 
itself They focus solely on the prevention of further 
acts. Retribution, however, has as its sole focus punish-
ment of the criminal for the crime committed, regard-
less of the criminal's potential to recidivate. The 
principle is that of jus talionis, an eye for an eye, 
retaliation. 51 
Understanding the difference between sentencing 
for deterrence and sentencing for retribution involves a 
hair-splitting distinction between what is considered 
"wrong" and what is considered "punishable."52 For 
purposes of this argument, wrong and punishable may 
be placed at opposite ends of a continuum of acts for 
which any judgment may be imposed. 
Wrong, on one end, covers purely administrative or 
statutory violations, characteristically punishable by 
fines, and construed to require a minimal amount of due 
process prior to imposition. A parking violation, for 
example, is nearly a pure wrong. The commission of a 
~~ - U. BaIt. L.r. / 25.2 __ _ --------------------------------
parking violation does little harm to society; thus, the 
sole reason for imposing a parking fine is to deter 
parking violators from recidivating and to deter others 
from violating parking laws. 53 
At the opposite end of the continuum are crimes 
that are purely punishable. These crimes are rare, 
because in a majority of cases, crimes that are punish-
able under a retribution theory are punishable under a 
deterrent theory as well. A sentence for murder, for 
example, demands not only that the crime be paid for, 
but also that a sentence be imposed that will deter others 
from committing the same crime. 54 
Consider, however, the following scenario: B 
murders A, who is the only other human being in 
existence. B cannot recidivate, nor are there any others 
who can possibly commit the same crime. B cannot, 
therefore, be sentenced under a deterrent theory, for 
there are none to deter. Neither can B be sentenced 
under an isolation theory, because there are none to 
protect from the possibility of 
of a crime even if satisfied that he is unlikely to commit 
further crimes."57 Implicit in Jones is the idea that 
retribution alone may serve as the justification for a 
particular sentence. 
Perhaps a better explanation of retribution is found 
in Gregg v. Georgia.58 In Gregg, the Supreme Court. 
quoted Williams v. New Yor!cS9 for the proposition that 
"[ r ]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the 
criminallaw."60 However, the Court later stated, "but 
neither is it a forbidden objective nor one inconsistent 
with our respect for the dignity of men. "61 The Court 
recognized that the appropriateness of a sentence may 
be determined by the community's belief as to what the 
sentence should be. Quoting Lord Justice Denning, the 
Court set forth the following passage in a footnote: 
Punishment is the way in which society expresses its 
denunciation of wrongdoing: and, in order to maintain 
respect for law, it is essential that the punishment 
inflicted for grave crimes 
B repeating his act. Finally, 
there is no sense in rehabilitat-
ing B, for there is no longer a 
"society" in which B must live 
and function normally. 
Yet it would seem fitting to 
us, as nonexistent observers of 
this scenario, if B were to do 
some type of penance -- inflict 
some type of punishment upon 
himself to "pay" for the crime 
that he committed. Failingthat, 
we would desire that B be struck 
A crime is an act 
against the community 
as well as against the 
victim. Thus the com-
munity, through the 
should adequately reflect the 
revulsion felt by the great 
maj ority of citizens for them. 
It is a mistake to consider the 
objects of punishment as be-
ing deterrent or reformative 
or preventive and nothing 
else . . . . The truth is that 
some crimes are so outra-
geous that society insists on 
adequate punishment, be-
cause the wrongdoer de-
legislature, may dictate 
what it considers the 
appropriate punish-
ment for the crime. 
by lightning, or fall and break a limb, or in some other 
way be made to suffer. This is because we identify the 
act of murder as wrong, and, more importantly, as 
punishable under a purely retributionist theory. Were 
we to fail to acknowledge retribution as a possible 
justification for sentencing B, there would be no sen-
tence imposed whatsoever. 
In Jones v. United States, 55 the United States Su-
preme Court discussed the possible justifications for 
sentences and noted, "[a] particular sentence of in car-
ceration is chosen to reflect society's view of the proper 
response to commission ofa particular criminal offense, 
based on a variety of considerations such as retribution, 
deterrence, and rehabilitation. "56 The Court further 
stated that "[t]he State may punish a person convicted 
serves it, irrespective of 
whether it is a deterrent or not. 62 
This passage provides insight into the rationale behind 
retribution as a theory of sentencing. A crime is an act 
against the community as well as against the victim. 
Thus the community, through the legislature, may 
dictate what it considers the appropriate punishment for 
the crime. 
Retribution has been acknowledged by Congress as 
a legitimate sentencing consideration. In determining 
the sentence to be imposed, the sentencing judge must 
consider the need for the sentence "to reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense."63 
The environmental sentencing statutes are part of the 
very legislation that is based, in structure, on a 
retributionist sentencing theory. 
Therein lies the fundamental flaw in relying exclu-
sively upon deterrence to justify the harshness of envi-
ronmental criminal sanctions. To ignore the retributive 
aspect of environmental sentencing is to ignore "the 
seriousness ofthe offense." It is a failure "to promote 
respect" for environmental law, and a failure to "pro-
vide just punishment for the offense" of environmental 
crime. To ignore the demands of retributionist theory 
is to ignore "the product of thousands of years of 
history, culture, tradition, religion, and other societal 
forces" embodied in retributionist theory.64 
The result, as previously noted, is a schizophrenic 
embrace of environmental sentencing statutes. We 
impose criminal sanctions65 on individuals whom we do 
not recognize as having committed "crimes" because 
their acts do not invoke (or we have not yet recognized 
them as invoking) the principles of retribution -- pure 
punishment for the crime committed. 
In United Statesv. Ellen,66 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed a six-month 
sentence imposed upon Ellen for violations ofthe Clean 
Water Act. 67 Ellen argued that his sentence could not 
stand unless his crime, destroying some eighty-six acres 
of federally protected wetlands, could be considered a 
"serious offense" under 28 U.S.C. § 9940).68 Uphold-
ing the sentence, the court noted that "[t]hrough the 
Clean Water Act and other environmental laws, Con-
gress has determined that harm to the environment -
even absent imminent threats to public health, welfare, 
or safety - is a public policy concern of the greatest 
magnitude. "69 
The court observed that in the Clean Water Act, 
"Congress determined that 'the restoration of the nat-
ural chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the 
Nation's waters is essential. '''70 Ignoring retribution as 
a theory of environmental sentencing detracts from that 
statement, because it fails to recognize the seriousness 
that society, through the legislature, has assigned to 
environmental crimes. It fails to recognize the inherent 
wrong in abusing natural resources. 
Ellen challenged his sentence, arguing that the 
destruction of wetlands, a critical natural resource, was 
not "an otherwise serious offense. "71 As the court aptly 
noted, "[t]hat Ellen believes that an offense of this 
magnitude is trivial or unimportant ironically exempli-
fies the need not to foreclose punishment by imprison-
ment in enforcing laws aimed at environmental protec-
tion."72 In this statement, the court implicitly recog-
nized the need to convey to defendants the seriousness 
of the offense, thereby affirming to society the integrity 
of its laws. 
IV. Recognizing Debate 
One possible counter-argument to the above theory 
is that if retribution has not been acknowledged as a 
justification for environmental sentencing, it is because 
society does not recognize environmental violations as 
crimes that would invoke retributive principles. The 
question then becomes whether a governing entity may 
impose criminal penalties for violations that the general 
population does not feel are "crimes." Though debat-
able, the answer must be resoundingly affirmative. If 
the answer were always in the negative, the use of the 
court system as an engine for effecting changes in 
societal behavioral patterns would be impossible. 
Apart from this theoretical response, however, 
there is evidence to refute the counter-argument on a 
factual basis as well. As early as 1970, polls indicated 
that "most Americans consider pollution to be the most 
serious problem facing their communities."73 In 1984, 
Americans ranked environmental crimes seventh on a 
list of serious crimes, ahead of heroin smuggling and 
skyjacking.74 A Denver Post survey in 1989 concluded 
that "environmental concerns would be one of the very 
highest priorities for the 1990s. "75 One commentator 
had this to say on whether environmental crimes de-
serve the strict penalty of prison terms: 
A strong argument can be made that crimes against the 
environment are more reprehensible than most "tradi-
tional" crimes. The damage wrought by pollution is 
devastating, widespread, and will be present for gener-
ations. Countless individuals have suffered ill-health 
and many have died as a result of pollution. These 
crimes are coolly carried out in a premeditated and 
methodical manner, motivated by the desire to make a 
proftt. 76 
It is this revulsion, felt by so many at the thought of 
natural resources abuse, that demands retribution for 
environmental crimes. It is this revulsion that the courts 
must consider when imposing sentences in determining 
the need for the sentence "to reflect the seriousness of 
the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense." It is this available in WESTLAW, C868 ALI-ABA 1, at *6. 
revulsion that demands a harsh sentence for environ- 4 United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines 
mental crimes even when the deterrent factor is nonex- Manual, Section 2Q (1993) (hereinafter Guidelines). 
istent.77 5 The Sentencing Commission has since released a 
new set of proposed corporate guidelines. For their text, 
V. Conclusion see Draft Corporate Sentencing Guidelines for Environ-
The investigation and prosecution ofenvironmen- mental Violations, 24 [Current Developments] Env't 
tal crimes has become an established part of our Rep. (BNA) at 1378 (Nov. 16, 1993). 
criminal justice system. Within its scope fall hundreds 6 Norton, supra note 3, at *3-4. 
of thousands of individuals, many college-educated, 7 The research for this paper, while not exhaustive, 
family-type people wholly devoid of what is normally yielded no discussions of the retributive aspect of envi-
considered "the criminal element." ronmental sentencing. 
There can be few things in this world more devas- 8 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
tating than subjection to criminal process. And in these (FIF~), 7 U. S. C. § 136 (1988); Toxic Substances 
days where the world is ever-shrinking, an individual to Control Act (TSCA), 15 US.c. § 2601 (1988); Endan-
whom the stigma of prosecution has attached is ever gered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988); 
more likely to have his trial revisited, well after the Clean Water Act (CWA) (formerly Federal Water Pol-
penalty has been paid and the wrong absolved. lution Control Act), 33 US.c. § 1251 (1988); Marine 
For these precise reasons, it is incumbent upon Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 
society, the legislature, and the judiciary to explore (MPRSA), 33 U.S.C. § 1401 (1988); and Resource 
retribution as a theory of sentencing in environmental Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (formerly 
crimes. For ifthere is truly no urge for retribution, no Solid Waste Disposal Act), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988). 
revulsion at the abuse of natural resources, no need to 9 FIFRA § 14, 7 U.S.c. § 1361(b); TSCA § 16, 15 
inflict punishment upon an environmental criminal for U.S.C. §2615(b);ESA§ 11, 16U.S.C. § 1540(b);CWA 
the pure sake of punishing, then ourreliance on criminal § 309, 33 U.S.c. § 1319(c); MPRSA § 105,33 U.S.C. 
sanctions to ensure environmental compliance is alto- § 1415(b); RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d); and 
gether misplaced. OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e)-(g). 
ENDNOTES 
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 (RHA) pro-
vided that "it shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, 
or deposit any refuse matter of any kind or description 
whatever" into navigable waters of the United States. 
RHAch.425§ 13,30 Stat. 1121, 1152. Aviolationof 
that provision, ifnot under the enumerated exceptions, 
subjected an individual to a $500-2,500 fine, or a prison 
term from thirty days to one year, or both. RHA ch. 425 
§ 16, 30 Stat. 1153. Moreover, the Act provided for 
a bounty payment - halfthe imposed fine - to be paid to 
the person giving information leading to conviction. 
Id 
2 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 
U.S. 1074 (1980). 
3 Frezza Bros. is often pointed to as the "first 
modem environmental criminal case." See, e.g., Michael 
1. Norton, Federal Environmental Criminal Law En-
forcement in the 1990s, ALI-ABA, Oct. 7, 1993, 
\0 15 US.C. § 2615(b). 
11 A producer under FIFRA is one who "manufac-
tures, prepares, compounds, propagates, or processes 
any pesticide or device or active ingredient used in 
producing a pesticide." 7 U.S.C. § 136(w). 
12 7 US.c. § 1361(b)(I)(A). 
13 A commercial applicator is "an applicator ... who 
uses or supervises the use of any pesticide which is 
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